Induction II

And of course I've forgotten my Kant. For how are we to say "One cannot know causality because of..." when the line itself presupposes causality is known? Naturally we cannot. But I find it still more interesting that my mentor says "Hume is a reductio [ad absurdum] of Locke, if we are to take Locke seriously." Apparently his colleagues think him mad for believing so, but it is an interesting point.

Anywho, it would seem I need a refresher course on what I have learned so that I might flesh out a better epistemology. I see now the problem arises because I never took an epistemology class. Although one cannot avoid the topic in other fields since epistemology needs to be prior to any study, since study is always of a thing and we must first "know" what we can "know" about this thing. Oops, it would seem I just slipped into some sort of metaphysical epistemology. Or is all epistemology metaphysical? I suppose these are some of the questions I need cleared up. Alas/Bleh. Hopefully my friend will send those epistemology papers sooner than later.

I need to clear up what it is that can be known from an empirical standpoint and what cannot. I mustn't slip back into Hume's argument against causality which presupposes causality. Perhaps a good reading of the divided line metaphor would help too. I'm not sure if I quite understood what it was I was reading at the time. And of course my books are either in Athens or I lent them out. Argggh.

Blake